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INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: REVISED TEXT OF WG PAPER ON TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE
AND VERIFY WITHDRAWALS

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: A. STATE 054475 B. USNATO 1007

1. FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS SPREAD OVER SEVERAL MEETINGS, MBFR
WG HAS NOW PRODUCED REVISED DRAFT OF SUBJECT PAPER, INCLUDING
AMENDMENTS RESULTING FROM ITS APRIL 2 REVIEW.

2. TEXT INCORPORATES NEW LANGUAGE FOR PARAS 22, 23, AND 24,
WHICH RESULT LARGELY FROM U.S. REP'S MARCH 24 INTERVENTION, DURING
WHICH HE DREW FULLY ON REF A INSTRUCTIONS. REVISED PARAGRAPHS
REFLECT SUBSTANTIALLY QUALIFIED JUDGMENTS ON SPECIFIC
TIMES, AND PLACE FIGURES IN TABLE (NOW RELEGATED TO AN ANNEX)
IN AN ILLUSTRATIVE CONTEXT. WE ARE POUCHING ANNEX SINCE IT CANNOT
BE TRANSMITTED BY CABLE. CONCLUDING SENTENCE IN PARA 24(B)
WOULD SEEM TO COVER U.S. VIEWS AND PROVIDE PROPER FRAMEWORK
FOR CONSIDERING FIGURES IN ANNEX.

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3. REFERENCES TO DISBANDMENT IN PARA 3, AS WELL AS ENTIRETY OF
PARA 20 (OLD PARA 19 IN REF B TEXT) HAVE BEEN DROPPED. STAFF
GROUP TOLD US INFORMALLY THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW HOW TO INTRODUCE
IDEAS PROPOSED IN PARA 1(B) OF REF A INSTRUCTIONS INTO TEXT BUT

WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS IF WASHINGTON WISHED TO PURSUE MATTER. COMMENT: SINCE CONCLUSIONS ARE NOW MORE IN LINE WITH

WASHINGTON WISHES, WE THINK FURTHER STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO TEXT ARE NOT

SPECIFICALLY NECESSARY. END COMMENT.

4. BRACKETS AROUND PARA 18(B) WERE INTRODUCED BY FRG REP TO PROTECT BONN'S CURRENT REVIEW OF NATO'S PROPOSED OVER VERIFICATION SYSTEM.

5. TEXT OF REVISED WG PAPER FOLLOWS. WG WILL COME BACK TO SUBJECT ON APRIL 9. CAN WASHINGTON ACCEPT NEW DRAFT WITH RESERVATION ON ANNEX? BEGIN TEXT:

INTRODUCTION

DURING THE SPC MEETING OF 1ST FEBRUARY, 1974, THE COMMITTEE INVITED THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE, INTER ALIA, "THE TIME THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE WITHDRAWAL UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE NUMBER OF FORCES PROPOSED BY THE ALLIES IN VIENNA AND ALSO THE TIME THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED THEREAFTER TO VERIFY THAT THE FORCES HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND WERE NOT BEING REPLACED"(1). THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO RESPOND TO THAT INVITATION.

2. THE PAPER IS DIVIDED INTO SEVEN SECTIONS. THIS SECTION INCLUDES THE ASSUMPTIONS UPON WHICH THIS EXAMINATION IS MADE AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE GENERAL APPROACH USED IN EVALUATING TIMES REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE WITHDRAWAL AND VERIFICATION. SUBSEQUENT SECTIONS DEAL WITH THE VARIOUS TASKS THAT MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED IN EACH OF FOUR PHASES OF A WITHDRAWAL, KEY FACTORS BEARING ON THE AMOUNT OF WITHDRAWAL TIME REQUIRED, THE ASSESSMENT OF WITHDRAWAL TIMES UNDER VARIOUS SCHEMES OF WITHDRAWAL, FACTORS BEARING ON VERIFICATION TIMES, THE ASSESSMENT OF VERIFICATION TIMES REQUIRED UNDER DIFFERENT FORMS OF A VERIFICATION AGREEMENT,
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AND CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE ASSESSMENT OF THE TIMES REQUIRED.

3. THE ORDER TO REFINE THE PARAMETERS OF THE SPC QUESTION, WE HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS:

(A) THE PHRASE "WITHDRAWAL UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES" MEANS THAT FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN IN PEACETIME, IN A POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE OF DETENTE, AND THAT WHILE IT IS NECESSARY TO CONDUCT THE PLANNING AND PHYSICAL WITHDRAWAL AT A STEADY PACE, THERE ARE NO COMPELLING REASONS TO ACCELERATE OR SPEED UP THE WITHDRAWAL EXCEPT THOSE THAT WILL BE DICTATED BY TECHNICAL FACTORS OR BY THE DESIRE TO CONDUCT AN ORDERLY, EFFICIENT WITHDRAWAL. MOVEMENTS ARE MADE

ADMINISTRATIVELY RATHER THAN TACTICALLY. IT REMAINS TRUE HOWEVER THAT THE ULTIMATE SPEED AT WHICH WITHDRAWALS WILL BE CARRIED OUT LARGELY DEPEND ON GOVERNING POLITICAL DECISIONS. IF THERE WERE A POLITICAL IMPERATIVE TO CONDUCT WITHDRAWALS IN A VERY SHORT TIME IT WOULD BE TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE TO MOVE ONE SOVIET TANK ARMY FROM THE GDR INTO SOVIET TERRITORY WITHIN THREE WEEKS.

(B) THE PHRASE "THE NUMBER OF FORCES PROPOSED BY THE ALLIES IN VIENNA" MEANS THAT THE USSR IS TO WITHDRAW ONE TANK ARMY OF APPROXIMATELY 68,000 MEN IN EXCHANGE FOR THE US WITHDRAWAL OF APPROXIMATELY 29,000 MEN.

(C) A WITHDRAWAL IS CONSIDERED TO BE COMPLETED WHEN UNITS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN TO THEIR HOMELAND AND HAVE EITHER BEEN DISBANDED, PUT INTO RESERVE STATUS OR HAVE PHYSICALLY ESTABLISHED THEMSELVES TO THE EXTENT THAT NORMAL, ROUTINE MILITARY ACTIVITIES MAY BE RESUMED.

4. THE APPROACH USED IN THIS PAPER IS TO EXAMINE THE COMPLEXITY OF THE TASK INVOLVED IN WITHDRAWAL, TO CONSIDER THE IMPACT THAT CERTAIN KEY FACTORS WILL HAVE ON WITHDRAWAL AND VERIFICATION TIMES, AND HAVING CONSIDERED THESE TASKS AND FACTORS TO MAKE SUBJECTIVE MILITARY JUDGEMENTS ON THE TIMES TO COMPLETE BOTH THE WITHDRAWAL AND VERIFICATION.

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5. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY OTHER APPROACH IS FEASIBLE. ALTHOUGH TIMES REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF A WITHDRAWAL CAN BE CALCULATED QUITE ACCURATELY - FOR EXAMPLE, THE TIME TO MOVE A UNIT A GIVEN DISTANCE AT A GIVEN RATE OF SPEED - MOST ELEMENTS CANNOT. THERE IS, FOR EXAMPLE, NO METHOD FOR CALCULATING THE TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE PLANNING, NOR TO PIN-POINT THE TIME TO COMPLETE PREPARATIONS FOR MOVEMENT. FURTHER, THE TIMES THAT COULD BE CALCULATED WITH SOME PRECISION ARE THOSE THAT HAVE THE LEAST IMPACT. FOR EXAMPLE, FROM THE MOMENT THE DECISION IS MADE TO WITHDRAW FORCES UNTIL WITHDRAWAL IS COMPLETE IS A MATTER OF MONTHS, WHEREAS THE TIME REQUIRED TO TRANSPORT PERSONNEL OR SMALL UNITS FROM WITHIN THE GDR TO THE THREE WMDS OR TO THE US IS, AS MOST, A MATTER OF DAYS. WHILE SUBJECTIVE JUDGEMENTS CANNOT PIN-POINT THE TIME TO WITHDRAW AND COMPLETE VERIFICATION, SUCH JUDGEMENTS, BASED UPON EXPERIENCE, CAN PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO THE MAGNITUDE OF TIME REQUIRED.

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PHASES OF A WITHDRAWAL

6. PLANNING PHASE. OF THE FOUR PHASES OF A WITHDRAWAL - PLANNING, PREPARATION, MOVEMENT, AND RELOCATION - THE PLANNING PHASE IS THE MOST DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX; IT ALSO GENERALLY REQUIRES THE MOST TIME TO COMPLETE. IT BEGINS WITH THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW AND DOES NOT COMPLETELY END UNTIL ALL TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT HAVE STARTED TO MOVE, EVEN THOUGH MOST OF THE PLANNING WILL HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY THE TIME TROOPS BEGIN TO PREPARE THEIR EQUIPMENT FOR MOVEMENT. THE PLANNING REQUIRED TO CONDUCT A MILITARY MOVE ON THE SCALE AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES ENVISAGED TOUCHES ON EVERY ASPECT OF MILITARY AND MANY CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES; IT INVOLVES ALL LEVELS OF COMMANDS AND THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION TO THE PRIMARY DECISIONS CONCERNING THE WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, AND HOW, TROOP AND INSTALLATION COMMANDERS MUST ARRIVE AT DECISIONS CONCERNING PERSONNEL (INCLUDING MOVEMENT AND RELOCATION OF FAMILIES), EQUIPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL MEASURES, TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, SECURITY, PUBLIC RELATIONS, SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE, AND TRANSPORT. FURTHER, COMMANDERS OF INSTALLATIONS, BOTH THOSE FROM WHICH TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN AND THOSE INTO WHICH TROOPS ARE TO MOVE, MUST PLAN AND MAKE MANY DECISIONS REGARDING
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THE OPENING AND/OR CLOSING OF INSTALLATION FACILITIES. THE DECISIONS THESE THROOP AND INSTALLATION COMMANDERS MUST MAKE CANNOT BE MADE IN ISOLATION, NEITHER ONE FROM THE OTHR, , NOR FROM CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES; ALL DECISIONS MUST BE CO-ORDINATED WITH HIGHER, LOWER, AND ADJACENT HEADQUARTERS. EVEN THOUGH CONCURRENT PLANNING TAKES PLACE AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND, THE PLANNING PHASE TO EFFECT AN ORDERLY, EFFICIENT MOVE WHILE MINIMISING RISKS TO NATIONAL SECURITY TAKES TIME. MILITARY COMMANDERS ARE ACUTELY AWARE OF THIS AND WILL WANT AS MUCH TIME TO COMPLETE DETAILED PLANS AS THEIR GOVERNMENTS WILL ALLOW.

7. PREPARATION PHASE. WHEN MOST OF THE PLANNING HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DECISIONS MADE, THE PROCESS OF PREPARING PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE MOVE BEGINS. REQUIRED LOADING EQUIPMENT AND CRATING AND PACKING MATERIAL AS WELL AS SPARE PARTS REQUIRED TO BRING ARMS AND EQUIPMENT UP TO THE PRECIBED READINESS AND MAINTENANCE STANDARDS FOR THE MOVE ARE ORDERED AND RECEIVED. TROOPS ARE TRAINING IN LOADING PROCEDURES AND BRIEFED ON THE FORTHCOMING MOVE. PERSONNEL PROCESSING BEGINS; ORDERS ARE CUT; TROOPS ARE INSPECTED AND ISSUED INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT, AS NECESSARY; EVACUATION OF THE HOSPITALISED BEGINS; FAMILIES START TO MOVE OUT. EQUIPMENT AND ARMS ARE READIED AND PACKED OR IN THE CASE OF US WITHDRAWALS PREPARATIONS ARE MADE TO STOCK-PILE EQUIPMENT TO BE LEFT BEHIND IN THE NGA. VEHICLES AND TANKS ARE REPAIRED AND INSPECTED. MAINTENANCE SHOPS, SUPPLY FACILITIES, AND TRAINING AREAS ARE CLEARED AND CLOSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH A CAREFULLY CO-ORDINATED AND ARTICULATED PLAN. AN ADVANCE PARTY IS DISPATCHED TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BIVOUACING AND RESUPPLY OF MOTOR CONVOYS ALONG THE ROUTE OF MARCH AND TO INITIATE PREPARATION FOR THE ORDERLY RECEIPT OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT AT THEIR NEW LOCATION. A REAR PARTY IS DESIGNATED TO ACCOMPLISH LIAISON WITH UNITS THAT MAY BE REDEPLOYED AND ARE SCHEDULED TO OCCUPY THE INSTALLATION BEING VACATED. PRESCRIBED CEREMONIES, IF ANY, ARE CONDUCTED. FINALLY, VEHICLES, TRAINS, AND PLANES ARE LOADED AND MOVEMENT BEGINS. THE DURATION OF THIS PHASE IS DEPENDENT UPON THE SKILL OF THE PLANNERS AND THE COMMANDERS WHO EXECUTE THE PLANS, AS WELL AS UPON THE SIZE OF THE UNIT PREPARING TO MOVE.

8. MOVEMENT PHASE. THIS PHASE BEGINS WITH THE DEPARTURE OF TROOPS FROM THEIR OLD LOCATION AND CONTINUES UNTIL THEIR
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ARRIVAL AT THE NEW ONE, WHETHER THAT LOCATION IS AN INSTALLATION OR, IN THE CASE OF DISBANDED UNITS, A NEW UNIT OR A CIVILIAN COMMUNITY. DURING THE MOVEMENT OF UNITS, COMMANDERS WILL BE CONCERNED WITH CONTROLLING THEIR CONVOYS, MAKING CERTAIN THEY ARRIVE AT CHECK-POINTS ON SCHEDULE, AND ENSURING THAT THEY ARE RESUPPLIED WITH POL AND FOOD AS REQUIRED. EXCEPT FOR DRIVERS, MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, FOOD HANDLERS, AND COMMUNICATORS, ENLISTED PERSONNEL ARE INACTIVE IF MOVEMENT IS BY MOTOR CONVOY; TROOPS ARE, OF COURSE, INACTIVE DURING MOVEMENT BY RAIL. THE DURATION OF THIS PHASE OBVIOUSLY DEPENDS UPON THE DISTANCE TO BE TRAVELLED AS WELL AS THE MODE OF TRANSPORTATION USED. NEVERTHELESS, DISTANCE AND MODE OF TRAVEL ARE NOT NEARLY AS IMPORTANT TO THE OVERALL DURATION OF THIS PHASE AS IS THE RATE OF WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, A FACTOR WHICH IS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN A SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPH OF THIS PAPER.

9. RELOCATION PHASE. IN CASE THERE IS NO STIPULATION IN A MBFR AGREEMENT ABOUT THE FINAL DESTINATION OF WITHDRAWN TROOPS OTHER THAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NGA INTO THE HOMELAND ONE COULD CONSIDER THIS PHASE TO BE IRRELEVANT IN THE CONTEXT OF MBFR. IT

REMAINS NEVERTHELESS TRUE THAT THE BEST PROOF OF PERMANET WITHDRAWAL IS A COMPLETED RELCATION. FOR THIS REASON IT IS MORE THAN PRUDENT TO INCLUDE A RELOCATION PHASE FOR WITHDRAWALS OTHER THAN MERELY THIN-OUTS. THIS PHASE BEGINS WITH THE ARRIVAL OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AT THEIR NEW INSTALLATION AND ENDS WHEN UNITS HAVE RE-ESTABLISHED THEMSELVES TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY CAN RETURN TO NORMAL, ROUTINTE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IN GENERAL, THIS PHASE ENTAILS TAKS WHICH ARE PRECISELY OPPOSITE TO THOSE OF THE PREPARATION PHASE. TROOPS ARE CONCERNED WITH UNLOADING, CHECKING, AND INSPECTING EQUIPMENT; RE-ESTABLISHING COMMUNICATIONS; OCCUPYING BILLET, MESS-HALLS, AND MOTORPARKS; AND RE-OPENING MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY, AND TRAINING FACILITIES. THE DURATION OF THIS PHASE IS DEPENDENT UPON COMPLETENESS OF PLANNING AND THE EXTENT AND CONDITION OF BARRACKS AND BUILDINGS IN THE NEW LOCATION.

10. OVERLAPPING OF PHASES. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THERE COULD BE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF OVERLAPPING OF THE VARIOUS PHASES. PREPARATIONS CAN START WHEN MOST BUT NOT ALL OF THE PLANNING IS COMPLETED AND THE FIRST MOVEMENTS COULD START TDURING THE LATTER STATGES OF THE PREPARATION PHASE. MOREOVER, THE

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(B) WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER UNDER THE CURRENT PROPOSAL THE US WOULD BE PERMITTED TO THIN OUT ITS FORCES, RETAINING ALL EXISTING UNITS WITHIN THE NGA, OR WOULD BE REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW UNITS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE US WOULD AGREE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ANY SIZEABLE COMBAT UNIT. SHOULD THE US AGREE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS, THEY WILL PROBABLY CONSIST OF

UNITS NO LARGER THAN A BRIGADE. ACCORDINGLY, THE TIME REQUIRED FOR THE US TO PLAN AND EXECUTE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS WILL BE LESS THAN THAT REQUIRED OF THE SOVIETS, NOT ONLY BECAUSE FEWER PERSONNEL ARE INVOLVED, BUT ALSO BECAUSE SIMILAR SIZED UNITS MAY BE INVOLVED.

12. RATE OF WITHDRAWAL

(A) THIS FACTOR DETERMINES THE OVERALL TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE MOVEMENT PHASE. IF THE SOVIETS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DO SO, THEY MIGHT CHOOSE TO WITHDRAW, FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE RATE OF ONE DIVISION PER WEEK, THUS ACCOMPLISHING THE MOVEMENT PHASE OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL IN SOMETHING UNDER TWO MONTHS. FOR TACTICAL AND SECURITY REASONS AND BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WOULD
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PROBABLY NOT WISH TO OVERBURDEN THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IN PEACETIME, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WOULD CHOOSE A MORE MODERATE RATE THAN ONE DIVISION PER WEEK, PERHAPS ONE REGIMENT PER WEEK, IN WHICH EVENT THE TIME TO COMPLETE THE MOVEMENT PHASE OF THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE GREATLY INCREASED.

(B) US RATE OF WITHDRAWAL WILL DEPEND PRIMARILY UPON THE AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT, PARTICULARLY IF THE US IS PERMITTED TO ACCOMPLISH REDUCTIONS BY THE THIN-OUT OF PERSONNEL. WHETHER US REDUCTIONS ARE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS OR BY THIN-OUT, THE US MOVEMENT PHASE CAN BE COMPLETED IN APPROXIMATELY HALF THE TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE SOVIET PHASE, IF BOTH SIDES AGREE TO USE THE SAME RATE OF WITHDRAWAL.

13. DISPOSITION OF THIN-OUT OF PERSONNEL VIS-A-VIS UNIT WITHDRAWAL. SHOULD AN AGREEMENT PERMIT REDUCTIONS BY "THIN-OUT", EXCESS AS A RESULT OF THIS THIN-OUT MIGHT BE STORED IN OR OUTSIDE OF THE NGA OR RETURNED TO SUPPLY CHANNELS WITHIN OR OUTSIDE OF THE NGA. OBVIOUSLY THE PRIMARY TIME DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN LOCATING EQUIPMENT WITHIN OR WITHOUT THE NGA IS THE TIME REQUIRED TO TRANSPORT THE EQUIPMENT TO AN AREA OUTSIDE THE NGA.

14. OTHER FACTORS. THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS WHICH HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE TIME REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW SUCH AS THE DISTANCE UNITS HAVE TO TRAVEL AND THE SEASON OF THE YEAR WHEN MOVEMENT IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. BUT THESE HAVE A MUCH LESSER IMPACT THAN THE KEY FACTORS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED AND WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED FURTHER.

TIMES REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW UNDER VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES

15. THE ANNEX SHOWS IN TABULAR FORM OUR EVALUATION OF THE TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL UNDER SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES FOR WITHDRAWAL AND DISPOSITION OF BOTH SOVIET AND US FORCES THAT

HAVE BEEN ALUDED TO IN PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS OF THE PAPER. THE TIMES SHOWN TO COMPLETE THE MOVEMENT PHASE OF THE WITHDRAWAL ARE PURELY A MATTER OF MATHEMATICS; THE RATES OF WITHDRAWAL ARE SIMPLY ILLUSTRATIVE OF WHAT WE BELIEVE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM RATES. THE TIME TO COMPLETE PLANNING IS OBVIOUSLY THE MOST DIFFICULT TO ASSESS; HOWEVER, CONSIDERING THE COMPLEXITIES

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OF THE MOVE, THE SIZE OF FORCES INVOLVED, THE MANY DECISIONS THAT HAVE TO BE MADE, AND THE EXTENSIVE CO-ORDINATION REQUIRED, WE BELIEVE THESE PLANNING TIMES ARE REALISTIC AND THAT THE ESTIMATES ACCURATELY REFLECT THAT THE TIME REQUIRED FROM DECISION POINT TO COMPLETION OF A WITHDRAWAL IS NOT A MATTER OF DAYS OR WEEKS. BUT ONE OF MANY MONTHS. AS STATED BEFORE SEVERAL PHASES COULD OVERLAP. THE TOTAL TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL AS LISTED IN THE LAST COLUMN OF ANNEX WOULD THEN BE A LITTLE SHORTER. BUT IN RELATION TO THE ASSUMPTION MADE IN PARAGRAPH 3(A) WE DO NOT THINK THAT THIS WOULD MAKE A GREAT DIFFERENCE.

FACTORS BEARING ON VERIFICATION TIMES

16. ELEMENTS OF VERIFICATION. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE SPC QUESTION THERE ARE TWO ELEMENTS OF THE REDUCTION PROPOSAL THAT MUST BE VERIFIED. FIRST, THERE IS A REQUIREMENT TO VERIFY WHAT WITHDRAWAL HAS TAKEN PLACE; SECOND, THERE IS A REQUIREMENT TO VERIFY THAT WITHDRAWAL FORCES ARE NOT BEING REPLACED. THE LATTER AND MORE DIFFICULT TASK WILL BE A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT LASTING FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD.

17. TIMING

(A) INSPECTION COULD BE CONDUCTED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, BEGINNING EITHER DURING THE PREPARATION OR THE BEGINNING OF THE MOVEMENT PHASE. IN THIS EVENT, VERIFICATION OF THE FIRST ELEMENT, WITHDRAWAL, COULD BE CONCLUDED AT THE END OF THE RELOCATION PHASE OR IF THERE IS NOT SUCH A PHASE AT THE END OF THE MOVEMENT PHASE. (B) VERIFICATION OF THE SECOND ELEMENT, NON- REPLACEMENT, SHOULD BEGIN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE START OF THE FIRST WITHDRAWALS, SO AS TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION.

18. TYPE OF VERIFICATION

(A) VERIFICATION COULD BE MADE OVERTLY OR COVERTLY. COVERT VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL WOULD INVOLVE CONSIDERABLY MORE TIME THAN OVERT VERIFICATION. COVERT VERIFICATION WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN PRIOR TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AND HAVE TO CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME AFTER ACTUAL COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL;

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OTHERWISE, THER WOULD BE NO WAY TO ASCERTAIN THAT
THE WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN COMPLETED.

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/(B) TO VERIFY THE FACT THAT WITHDRAWN FORCES WERE NOT
BEING REPLACED NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF
VERIFICATION WOULD BE THE MAIN ELEMENT IN A
VERIFICATION SYSTEM. BUT OVERT VERIFICATION
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO BACK UP NATIONAL TECHNICAL
MEANS, TO ESTABLISH BREACHES MUCH MORE RAPIDLY,
AND TO CONFRONT THE VIOLATING PARTY/

19. NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF INSPECTION TEAMS. THE TIME
REQUIRED TO VERIFY BOTH THE WITHDRAWAL AND THE NON-REPLACEMENT
OF REDUCTION FORCES WILL VARY DIRECTLY WITH THE NUMBER OF
INSPECTION TEAMS AND THEIR COMPOSITION. MOBILE TEAMS ARE BEST
SUITED TO VERIFY THAT REPLACEMENT OF REDUCTIN FORCES HAS NOT
TAKEN PLACE. IF THEY COULD BE SUPPORTED BY SOME STATIC POSTS
AND A FORM OF AERIAL INSPECTION SO MUCH THE BETTER.

29. DISCUSSION OF INSPECTION AREAS (DELETED AT APRIL 2 MEETING)

21. UNITS VS PERSONNEL. VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL
AND NON-REPLACEMENT OF PERSONNEL IS MORE DIFFICULT AND TIME-
CONSUMING THAN VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL AND NON-REPLACEMENT
OF UNITS.

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TIMES REQUIRED TO VERIFY WITHDRAWAL AND TO OBSERVE

NON-CIRCUMVENTION

22. AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 16 THE REQUIREMENT TO VERIFY THAT WITHDRAWN FORCES WERE NOT BEING REPLACED WOULD BE A CONTINUING ONE WHICH COULD LAST FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD. IT WOULD START SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE MOVEMENT PHASE, COVER THE RELOCATION PHASE AND CONTINUE AFTER WITHDRAWALS WERE COMPLETE. THE MOVEMENT AND RELOCATION STAGES COULD TAKE FROM 2-9 MONTHS. IN THE EVENT THAT THE PERIOD WERE THE VERY SHORT ONE OF 2 MONTHS, THIS COULD RAISE PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION AND PERHAPS OF THE REPOSITIONING OF NATO FORCES. FIRSTLY 2 MONTHS WOULD BE A VERY SHORT TIME TO VERIFY WITH CONFIDENCE THAT WITHDRAWN FORCES WERE NOT BEING REPLACED. SECONDLY, AS A RESULT OF OUR OWN REDUCTIONS, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO REPOSITION CERTAIN NATO FORCES FOR MILITARY AND SECURITY REASONS. BOTH THESE FACTORS INDICATE THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO INITIATE PHASE II REDUCTIONS UPON THE COMPLETION OF THE MOVEMENT AND RELOCATION STAGES OF PHASE I REDUCTIONS OF THESE LATTER TOOK ONLY 2 OR 3 MONTHS.

23. WHETHER, AS A SAFETY FACTOR, A FURTHER PERIOD SHOULD BE ADDED IS A MATTER OF JUDGEMENT AND NOT A MATTER FOR ACCURATE ASSESSMENT. HOWEVER, IT COULD BE SAID THAT, THE SHORTER THE TIME TAKEN TO WITHDRAW AND RELOCATE, THE MORE NEED THERE WOULD BE FOR A SAFETY FACTOR.

CONCLUSION

24. THE TIMES FOR WITHDRAWAL ESTIMATED IN THIS PAPER ARE BASED ON ADMINISTRATIVE/TECHNICAL/PLANNING REQUIREMENTS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS. THEY ARE NECESSARILY SPECULATIVE.

(A) THE ASSESSMENTS HAVE BEEN DIVIDED INTO PHASES - PLANNING; PREPARATION; MOVEMENT; RELOCATION. THESE ARE SHOWN CUMULATIVELY AT ANNEX TO PROVIDE A TIME SPAN, THE LOWER EDGE OF WHICH IS THE SUM OF MINIMUM TIMES REQUIRED TO COMPLETE EACH STAGE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PHASES THEM-
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SELVES COULD OVERLAP; E.G. PREPARATION COULD BE UNDERTAKEN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE LATER STAGES OF PLANNING; AND MOVEMENT OF SOME ELEMENTS (E.G. PERSONNEL) COULD BEGIN BEFORE PREPARATION FOR OTHER MOVES (E.G. HEAVY EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN COMPLETED. THE VERIFICATION OF RELOCATION COULD BE REGARDED AS A CONTINUING VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT, NOT DIRECTLY AFFECTING THE TIME REQUIRED BETWEEN THE PHASES OF MBFR. FINALLY, THE PLANNING PHASE- THE LARGEST AND THE NECESSARY PRELIMINARY TO THE OTHERS COULD (AND PROBABLY WOULD) BEGIN WHEN

NEGOTIATIONS REACHED THE STAGE AT WHICH THE SCALE AND FORM OF PROBABLE REDUCTIONS BECAME IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUFFICIENT PROVISION. THIS COULD BE SOME TIME BEFORE ACTUAL SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT.

(B) THE ASSESSED TIMES (ANNEX) THEREFORE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS INDICATIVE OF THE TIMES REASONABLY REQUIRED FOR EACH PHASE OF ACTION (PLANNING; PREPARATION; WITHDRAWAL). THE SUM OF THESE ESTIMATES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS MINIMUM TIMES BETWEEN SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT AND OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND STAGE. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PLANNING COULD BE CONDUCTED BEFORE SIGNATURE OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT IS SPECULATIVE. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS COULD EXERCISE AN OVERRIDING INFLUENCE ON THE SPEED OF WITHDRAWAL AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH PHASES MIGHT OVERLAP.

END TEXT RUMSFELD

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 APR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO01869
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740482/abbryues.tel
Line Count: 562
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. STATE 054475 B. USNATO 1007
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 19 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: REVISED TEXT OF WG PAPER ON TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE AND VERIFY WITHDRAWALS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO VIENNA
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005